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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the Allied bombing of Vietnam, the longest and heaviest aerial
bombardment in history, imposed detrimental ramifications on educational attainment and future
labor market outcomes of school-age individuals. By exploiting the plausibly exogenous district-
by-cohort variation in bomb destruction under a difference-in-differences framework, we find that
an increase in bomb intensity leads to significantly fewer educational years completed and lower
future earnings for school-age children exposed to the bombardment. We further show that both
the supply-side factors (inadequate school security and the lack of teachers) and the demand-side
factors (residential casualties, restricted access to healthcare, damaged properties, and increased
reliance on welfare assistance) could be potential mechanisms driving the long-term consequences of
aerial bombardment. Our findings underline the importance of conflict prevention and post-conflict
reconstruction in promoting sustainable development.
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1 Introduction
The dread of war and its disruptive consequences, ranging from the destruction of capital
and infrastructure to health and environment disasters, are widely known. From a macro
perspective, armed conflicts can hinder long-term economic development by inducing poverty
traps (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Sachs, 2008) or discouraging capital accumulation
(Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007). From a micro viewpoint, wars could potentially lead to
severe disruptions to people’s lives such as worsened health conditions, shortened schooling
accumulation and distorted labor market outcomes (Bundervoet et al., 2009; Akbulut-Yuksel,
2014; Bruck et al., 2019). Other dreadful consequences of armed conflicts include diverting
resources from production, direct destruction of infrastructure, and increased mortality rates
(Collier, 2009).
This paper makes three contributions to the branch of research on the relationship between
conflict and development. First, we focus on the less discernible but persistent cost of conflict
while the majority of attention has been paid to the immediate consequences on individuals
with urgent humanitarian needs (Bruck et al., 2017). Specifically, we examine the long-term
consequences of aerial bombardment on educational accumulation and future earnings of
school-aged children. Our context of study is the bombing of Vietnam, which is by far the
longest and heaviest aerial bombardment in history.1 Moreover, Vietnam was very poor at
the time of the bombardment period, making Vietnamese school-aged children especially
vulnerable to the shocks arising from such large-scale destruction.
Second, we rigorously analyze the potential pathways to the adverse ramifications of aerial
bombardment by evaluating both the supply-side factors and the demand-side factors of
education. Finally, we introduce a more precise measure of aerial bombardment. Unlike
previous studies which either have limited or no information on the intensity of armed conflicts
(Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Bundervoet et al., 2009), or rely on unadjusted measures
of destruction such as the quantity of bombs (Miguel and Roland, 2011), our measure of
bombing devastation is the bomb density - defined as the total weight of all weapons (in tons)
1 Throughout the Vietnam War, over 7.5 million tons of explosives were dropped by the U.S. and its allies.
The total weight of bombs delivered was three times as much as that dropped during the European and
Pacific Theater in World War II.
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dropped onto a district, divided by its area (in square kilometer).2 3 As pointed by Mueller
(2016), measurement issues can bias the estimating results. The incorporation of per-area
weapon weight, which adjusts for the destructive power of different classes of weapons, can
provide a more accurate measure for the bombardment havoc.
We utilize the data from the Theater History of Operation and the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Survey. The newly released Theater History of Operation offers rich information
on the bomb intensity. The Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey provides us with
rich individual-level information such as demographics, education, and income, among others.
In terms of identification strategy, we employ the difference-in-differences (DiD) model to
examine the impacts of wartime bombardment on educational accumulation and future labor
market outcomes. Within the DiD framework, we exploit the district-by-cohort variation in
bombing devastation.
Our study reaches the following findings. First, a 10% increase in bomb density leads
school-age individuals exposed to the aerial bombardment for at least five years to complete
0.01 fewer years of education. To put these numbers to perspective, the gap in educational
attainment between an individual in an average bombed district and an individual in the most
heavily bombed district is about 0.3 years. Second, we explore the non-linear effects of aerial
bombardment. Third, differential impacts of bomb destruction across gender are detected
with larger repercussions on females. Fourth, aerial bombardment leaves a long-lasting
adverse impact on future labor market outcomes, mostly on female earnings. Fifth, we
detect differential effects by bomb missions and targets. Finally, we show that both the
supply-side factors (inadequate school security and the lack of teachers) and the demand-
side factors (residential casualties, restricted access to healthcare, damaged properties, and
increased reliance on welfare assistance) could be potential mechanisms driving the long-term
consequences of aerial bombardment.
Our findings offer meaningful policy implications. By showing the adverse ramifications of
aerial bombardment on human capital, this paper sheds additional light on the persistent
cost of violent conflict that has been insufficiently considered. Individuals exposed to aerial
2 Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) uses “being born in Austria and Germany” and “being born between
1930-1939” as an exposure to World War II. Bundervoet et al. (2009) rely on the timing and location of
the civil war.
3 Weapons include different classes of bombs, missiles, rockets, and ammunition. See Section 3.1 for details.
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bombardment during school age accumulated fewer years of education and had worse labor
market outcome in the future. Given the possibility of intergenerational transmissions, these
burdens of conflict could be passed on to the future generation. Our results suggest that the
prevention and reduction of conflict should be put as one of the global priorities, in order to
promote peaceful societies for sustainable development (SDG-16). Our findings further imply
that post-conflict reconstruction initiatives are important when conflicts already occurred.
Government interventions aiming to improve the abilities/skills of affected individuals could
help lessen the cost of conflict.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and theoretical
discussion. Section 3 describes the data and our analysis sample. Section 4 presents the
empirical methodology. Section 5 provides the estimation results, falsification test, and
robustness check. Section 6 explores potential mechanisms. Section 7 concludes our paper.
2 Literature Review and Theoretical Discussion
2.1 Literature Review
This paper is related to the literature on the costs of conflict. At the aggregate level, conflict
destroys production capacity and induces GDP loss (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007; Sachs,
2008; Dunne et al., 2013). At the micro-level, conflict can impose immediately apparent cost
such as the loss of lives (Blomberg et al., 2004; Anderton and Carter, 2009). Furthermore,
violent conflict also leaves potentially immense costs which are less visible and inadequately
measured namely increased health risks, disruption of the education process, and distorted
labor market outcome (Bruck et al., 2012; Dunne et al., 2013; Bruck et al., 2019).
It is documented that conflict imposes detrimental consequences on health outcomes. The
health costs are acutely borne by women evident by higher risk of physical and mental trauma
since women tend to be targeted in times of violence (Usta et al., 2008; Shemyakina, 2011;
Justino, 2012). In addition to these relatively immediate impacts, conflict can have long
lasting ramifications on health. Specifically, children exposed to conflict tend to be shorter
in height and are more likely suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders in adulthood than
those unaffected (Catani et al., 2008; Bundervoet et al., 2009; Akresh et al., 2012).
Prior studies also show that conflict can adversely affect the accumulation of education and
labor market outcome. Affected children not only have lower academic achievement and have
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their schooling disrupted (Bruck et al., 2019), but they also attain fewer years of education
(Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011; Leon, 2012). Violent conflict can
perpetuate inequality as children from disadvantaged background exposed to conflict will
continue to lag behind in terms of education, thus reinforcing the socio-economic advantages
over time (Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011; Bruck et al., 2017). Given the detrimental
effects on education, exposure to conflict during school ages also leads to declining labor
earnings in adulthood (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014).
By investigating the impacts of violent conflict on educational attainment and labor market
outcome, this paper makes three contributions to the branch of research on the relationship
between conflict and development. First, we estimate the less discernible but persistent cost
of conflict, while the majority of attention has been paid to the immediate consequences on
individuals with urgent humanitarian needs (Bruck et al., 2017). Second, we rigorously analyze
the potential pathways to the adverse ramifications of aerial bombardment by evaluating
both the supply-side factors and the demand-side factors of education. Finally, we introduce
a more accurate measure of aerial destruction compared to prior studies, the total weight
of all weapons dropped onto a district per km2 area. The study context is the bombing of
Vietnam, which is of interest because of two reasons. The country was very poor at the time,
making Vietnamese school-aged children especially vulnerable to the shocks arising from such
large-scale destruction. Besides, the bombing of Vietnam is the longest and heaviest aerial
bombardment in history where over 7.5 million tons of explosives were dropped by the U.S.
and its allies (three times the amount in the European and Pacific Theater in World War II).
2.2 Theoretical Discussion
To guide our empirical study, we provide a simple model where bombing distorts the efficiency
in accumulating human capital, thus, discouraging educational attainment. Suppose that
individuals are expected to live for T > 0 years (excluding retiring and pre-schooling years).
At year τ ≤ T , individuals face two options: (1) leaving school to join the labor market, or
(2) staying in school to accumulate human capital. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
individuals cannot go back to school after joining the labor market. Let us denote by s ≥ 0
the “additional years of schooling” expected to attain by an individual at year τ . Her human
capital after s additional years of schooling is given by,
hτ+s = hτ exp
[
s Θ(x)
]
(1)
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where hτ = h0 exp
[
τ Θ(x)
]
is the level of human capital at year τ , with τ years of schooling
and h0 innate human capital. The value of Θ(·) represents the local level of efficiency affecting
human capital production, and x is the degree of destruction caused by the aerial bombing.
We assume that ∂Θ(x)/∂x < 0, such that the efficiency level is negatively correlated with
bombing destruction. Thus, after s years of additional schooling, human capital increases by
an amount of ∆hτ = hτ+s − hτ , given by,
∆hτ = hτ exp
[
s Θ(x)
]
− hτ (2)
By staying in school to gain ∆hτ unit of human capital, she produces zero unit of output
for s years. However, if she chooses to quit school and go to work, her production function
exhibits constant returns to scale technology taking a form of:
yτ = hτ (3)
where yτ is the amount of output produced, and hτ is the level of human capital accumulated
up to year τ . Normalizing output price to one, zero-profit condition implies that individual
earning is also her human capital wτ = hτ . The discounted value of lifetime gain from s
additional years of schooling (∆Ωτ ) can be expressed as follows,
∆Ωτ =
∫ T
τ+s
hτ+se
−ρtdt−
∫ T
τ
hτe
−ρtdt (4)
where ρ is the discount factor. Thus, the marginal return of the additional years of schooling
evaluated at year τ is given by,
∂∆Ωτ
∂s
∆
=
Θ(x)− ρ
eρ(τ+s)
−
Θ(x)
eρT
(5)
The symbol , indicates that common terms are suppressed for simplicity. The first order
condition, i.e. setting ∂∆Ωτ/∂s = 0, yields the optimal years of schooling,
τ + s =


τ , if x > x˘
T +
1
ρ
ln
[
Θ(x)− ρ
Θ(x)
]
> τ , if x ≤ x˘
(6)
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Here, the value of the threshold x˘ can be obtained from inverting the equality Θ(x) =
ρ
/
1 − e−Tρ. Put it differently, x˘ = Θ−1
(
ρ
/
1− e−Tρ
)
. The model generates two impor-
tant predictions regarding the relationship between bombing destruction x and individuals’
educational attainment τ + s.
First, the probability of staying in school P (τ + s > τ) is directly linked to the degree of
destruction x according to the equality P (τ + s > τ) = P (x ≤ x˘). Therefore, the theory
suggests that across geographic units and individuals identical in all respects except for
the degree of bombing destruction, the higher the degree of destruction x, the lower the
probability of staying in school P (τ + s > τ). In other words, when the degree of bombing
destruction exceeds a certain threshold x˘, individuals will drop out of school. We refer to
this relationship as the impact of bombing on education at the extensive margin.
Second, individual’s additional years of schooling s, conditional on staying in school s > 0, is
a decreasing function of bombing destruction x. To see this, we differentiate the second case
of equation (6) with respect to the degree of destruction x to obtain the following,
sign
[
∂si(x|x < x˘)
∂x
]
= sign
[
∂Θ(x)
∂x
]
< 0 (7)
Thus, the theory also suggests that an increase in the degree of bombing destruction generates
a reduction in individuals’ years of schooling, conditional on staying in school. We refer to
this relationship as the impact of bombing on education at the intensive margin.
Overall, the model shows that the aerial bombardment decreases educational attainment of
school-age individuals during the wartime. At the extensive margin, the devastation forces
them to drop out of school. At the intensive margin, aerial bombardment shortens the
additional years of education for those not dropping out.
3 Data and Analysis Sample
3.1 Data Overview
The data for this study is drawn from two sources: the Theater History of Operations (THOR)
and the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2010-2014 (VHLSS).
Theater History of Operations (THOR) − We first use the THOR database released
by the U.S. Department of Defense in late 2016 to measure bombing intensity at the district
6
level.4 The raw data were recorded at the flight-mission level drawn from the Combat
Activities File 1965-1970 (CACTA), the Southeast Asia Aerial Bombing Database 1970-1975
(SEADAB), and the Strategic Air Command’s Combat Activities 1965-1973 (SACCOACT).
The publicly available information includes a description of each mission (e.g. mission code,
date, operation supported, source of mission logs), a description of aircrafts carrying out the
mission (e.g. Air Force Groups, type and quantity of aircrafts, takeoff location, fly hours, time
on target), a description of weapons delivered (e.g. ordnance type, quantity, weight, purpose
category, and time off target), and a description of mission targets (e.g. latitude-longitude
coordinates of targets, target description, weather condition, and bomb damage assessment).
The richness of the THOR database enables us to construct our explanatory variable of
interest, the measure of bomb destruction. There are approximately 4.84 million flight
missions carried out by 104 types of aircraft during the period of 1965 - 1975. The mainly
used type of aircraft is the fighter-bomber McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, carrying out
approximately 957,427 missions. There are 239 main classes of weapons delivered during the
Vietnam War including 173 classes of bombs, 25 classes of missiles, 28 classes of rockets, and
13 classes of ammunition.
To capture the district-level intensity of bombs delivered from 1965 to 1975, we construct the
bomb density measure (in tons per square-kilometer, t/km2), by dividing the total weight
of all weapons (in tons) dropped within a district boundary by its area (in km2). Weapon
weight is a more precise measure of bomb destruction than bomb quantity utilized in prior
studies. For example, a heavy bomb-type ammunition is much more destructive than a light
shot-type ammunition. Besides adopting the weapon weight, our measure of bomb intensity is
further accurately captured by incorporating the destruction site area. The per-area weapon
weight adjusts for the devastating nature of different classes of weapons.
Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) − By special permission, we
obtain access to three waves (2010, 2012, and 2014) of the VHLSS from the General Statistics
Office (GSO) of Vietnam.5 6 The VHLSS is a nationally representative household survey
conducted by GSO with technical support from the World Bank. This dataset provides rich
4 The THOR dataset can be accessed at the website of the Air Force Research Institute (www.au.af.mil).
5 The VHLSS can be obtained from the official website of GSO (www.gso.gov.vn).
6 According to the Law on Statistics of Vietnam, statistical information circulated by the GSO has the
highest legal effect.
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information at the individual level including demographics, education and income.
Our dependent variables of interest are individual education and annual earnings. In terms
of education, each household member is asked to specify the grade he/she has completed in
school and the educational level (college, university, master, or PhD). Our main explanatory
variable of interest is the number of school grade completed. We also construct an additional
measure accounting for the educational level. Particularly, individuals with college, university,
master, and Ph.D. degrees are assigned with 14, 16, 18, and 20 years of education, respectively.
As for incomes, the income modules are consistently conducted over time. Income refers to
earnings from different sources in the last 12 months. Recall that we focus on the earnings of
individuals. In each household, a member working as paid employee in the past 12 months
provides information on his/her main job in terms of the total main salary received and other
incomes related to that salaried job (such as bonuses, social subsidy, etc.). If the person has
a second/third job, the same income information is collected. Our measure of individual
earning is the total amount (main salary and other incomes for main jobs as well as for other
jobs) each person receives during the past 12 months. In this paper, we focus on individuals
with salaried jobs. Because it is not feasible to obtain individual incomes for those working
in family farms and family businesses.
3.2 Analysis Sample
We examine the long-run consequences of aerial bombardment in a DiD framework, which
requires one affected (treated) group and one unaffected (control) group.7 In our main setup,
we choose the 1953-1963 cohorts as the affected group and the 1985-1996 cohorts as the
unaffected group. Specifically, war (affected) cohorts are defined as individuals who spent
at least five years of schooling during the bombing period of 1965-1975. We believe that
the five years of exposure is long enough for the effects of bombing to be realized. We then
proceed to drop the 1948-1952 and 1964-1969 cohorts because they were exposed to bombing
for fewer than five school years.8 Table A1 in the Appendix presents the number of school
years subject to aerial bombardment. We exclude individuals born between 1970 and 1984
since this group attended school during the Reconstruction period and thus might partially
7 Details of this method are provided in Section 4.
8 We do, however, include these individuals in the affected (war) cohorts in a robustness check. Categorizing
them into the war cohorts does not substantially change our result.
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suffer from adverse effects of the large-scale bombing destruction.
Individuals born during 1985-1996 constitute the non-war (unaffected) cohorts since they
attained their education after the “Doi Moi”, marking an end to the postwar reconstruction
period. We further restrict our sample to those at least 18 years old, i.e. those supposed to
finish high school when being surveyed. Moreover, macro-level studies suggest that economies
quickly return to their steady state within 20 years after wars, (Davis and Weinstein, 2002,
Brakman et al., 2004, and Miguel and Roland, 2011), lending additional support to our choice
of the 1985-1996 cohorts as the unaffected group. Although the main analysis sample only
comprises the 1953-1963 war cohorts and the 1985-1996 non-war cohorts, the estimation using
different categorizations of the affected-unaffected groups is reported in various robustness
checks.
Summary statistics for individual-level and district-level variables are respectively presented
in Panel A and B of Table A2. An issue with the VHLSS is that they only provide the number
of school grades completed. In other words, the number of years of education is top-coded at
12. Therefore, we adopt this raw top-coded measure of education as our primary outcome.
We also attempt to deal with this issue by imputing the total number of educational years
based on the reported grade completed and the educational level in a different specification.
Particularly, individuals with college, university, master, and Ph.D. degrees are assigned with
14, 16, 18, and 20 educational years respectively.
As shown in Panel A of Table A2, the war cohorts completed 7.5 years of schooling on average
while the non-war cohorts finished 9.75 years. Our measure of labor market outcomes is
individual annual earnings. The mean annual earning among the war cohorts is roughly 35
million VND (around 1,500 USD) whereas on average, the non-war cohorts earn approximately
29 million VND (1,300 USD) per year.9 Turing to district-level variables, as visible from
Panel B, the average bomb dropped onto a district is 11.42 tons per km2 and the maximum
bomb density is 279.38 tons per km2. In the final sample, there are approximately 32,000
individuals across 625 districts of 63 provinces.
4 Empirical Methodology
To evaluate the effects of aerial bombardment on schooling accumulation and labor market
outcomes, we rely on the exogenous district-by-cohort variation in bomb destruction intensity,
9 All monetary values in the paper are in 2010 constant price.
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and employ a DiD framework given in the following equation,
Yidt = β0 + β1WarCohortic × BombIntensityd +X
′
idcγ + δd + λt + ǫidt (8)
where Yidt is the outcomes of interest for individual i residing in district d and born in
year t, including the number of educational years and the log of annual earnings. The
WarCohortc term is a dummy variable taking a value of one if an individual belongs to the
affected group, where the subscript c refers to the cohort group (either affected or unaffected),
and zero otherwise. Particularly, the affected group comprises individuals exposed to the
Allied bombing for at least five schooling years (born between 1953 and 1963).10 11 The
BombIntensityd term is the log of bomb density measure where bomb density is defined as
the total weight of all weapons (in tons) dropped onto district d divided by the district area
(in square kilometers).
The vector X ′idc includes: (i) individual observable characteristics (e.g. gender, mother
education, indicator for living in the north) and survey year fixed effects, (ii) a set of
interactions between the observables and birth year dummies to account for differential return
of these demographic characteristics by cohorts (Acemoglu et al., 2004), and (iii) another set
of interactions between district-level geographic controls and birth year indicators to account
for the factors determining local economic conditions and strategic bombing decisions during
wartime. Geographic variables proxying for local development include districts’ centroid
longitude, latitude, distance to coast, average precipitation, temperature, terrain ruggedness,
land suitability, and the share of arable land (excluding water, snow, and ice surface, as
well as barren or sparsely vegetated surface) in district total areas. Other geographic factors
potentially affecting military strategy during the Vietnam War are also controlled for, such
as district average altitude and district centroid distance to Ho Chi Minh Trail (Miguel and
Roland, 2011).12
We denote by δd and λt district and birth year fixed effects, respectively. Finally, ǫidc stands
for the error term. We also control for the province-specific time trend and cluster standard
10 Ideally, we should use the individual’s district of birth instead of the district of residence. However, the
VHLSS does not provide this information. We address the potential issue of migration in Section 5.1.2.
11 As a robustness check, we also consider those ever exposed to the bombardment during their schooling
time as the war cohorts.
12 For example, Ho Chi Minh trail was the main route through which the Communists supplied their backed
insurgents fighting in the South, therefore, was bombed heavily.
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errors at the district-by-birth-year level. Coefficient of interest β1 captures the effects of aerial
bombardment on educational attainment and labor market outcomes for the war cohorts.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Results on Educational Attainment
5.1.1 Main Results and Heterogeneity
We report our baseline results on educational attainment from equation (8) in Table 1. Each
cell is the DiD estimate from a regression that controls for district and birth year fixed effects,
survey year fixed effects, and several sets of interactions as discussed in Section 4. As evident
from Column 1, the estimated effect for the full sample is negative (-0.098) and statistically
significant at 1%. This implies a 10% increase in bomb density leads to a reduction of
approximately 0.01 years of education for individuals who spent at least five years of their
schooling during the bombardment time.13 To get a better understanding of the magnitude
of the impact, we compare the educational attainment of an individual in a heavily bombed
district, say, Gio Linh (Quang Tri Province) where the bomb density was 279.38 ton/km2
(the maximal bomb density, Table A2), and an individual in a district with an average bomb
density (11.42 ton/km2, Table A2). Individuals of school age during the bombing period in
Gio Linh completed 0.3 years of education than those in a district with an average destruction
level. This impact is consonant with the effect of violent conflicts on educational attainment
documented in Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) and Leon (2012).
We present the heterogeneous impacts of aerial bombardment along the lines of gender and
mother’s education in Column 2 through 5 of Table 1. A female who spent at least five
school years during the bombardment finished 0.012 fewer educational years in response to
a 10% increase in bomb density (Column 3) while the reduction for a male counterpart is
roughly 0.008 year (Column 2). This finding is consistent with Shemyakina (2011) where a
larger impact of armed conflicts on females is documented. As evident from Column 4 and 5,
individuals with higher-educated mothers (mothers’ education is higher than primary level)
13 Because BombIntensity is the log of bomb density, the linear-log specification (8) where the outcome is
the number of educational years omits the six districts which were not bombed at all. To this respect,
we re-estimate equation (8) where BombIntensity is log(1 + bombdensity). The point estimate is still
negative and significant, implying the gap of 0.5 years of education between affected individuals in the
most heavily bombed district and affected individuals in the district with an average destruction level
(Column 1 of Table A3).
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were hardly affected by the bomb destruction while individuals with a more disadvantaged
background (mother with lower educational attainment, primary education or less) bore larger
consequences. Having said that, due to a large number of missing values for mother’s education,
we urge some caution in interpreting the heterogeneous effects of aerial bombardment in this
respect.
Taken together, we detect negative consequences of aerial bombardment on educational
attainment. The educational gap between an individual of school age during the bombing
period in the most heavily destroyed district and the one in the average bombed district
is 0.3 years. The magnitude is comparable to the one in previous studies (Leon, 2012;
Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014). The estimates underline the dreadful cost of violent conflict to human
capital accumulation. Our results are consistent with prior literature on the micro-level
effects of conflict on school attainment (Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011;
Leon, 2012). Our findings also supplement Bruck et al. (2019) which reveals that exposure
to conflict decreases the probability of passing the final exam, test score, and the probability
of entry into higher education.
5.1.2 Mobility, Falsification, and Nonlinearity
Endogenous Mobility - It should be noted that in equation (8) we measure the bomb
density at the district of residence (not the district of birth) level. Endogenous mobility
could potentially contaminate our coefficient estimates since people might have reallocated
from heavily bombed districts to less destroyed ones for better living conditions or the
heavily destroyed districts might have been better in attracting labor and talent during the
reconstruction era. We test for this potential contamination by creating a migration indicator
(Migration) that takes the value of one if the individual lacks permanent registration in
his/her residential district.14 Demombynes and Vu (2016) documented that very few people
moved without the sanction before 1990 and those who did move struggled to survive without
a local “ho khau” (permanent registration). Using Household Registration data of Vietnam,
Demombynes and Vu (2016) further shows that the population without permanent registration
has demographics characteristics that are typical of migrant populations. Therefore, the
probability of not holding “ho khau” is a good proxy for the probability of migration.
14 This permanent registration system known as “ho khau”, which is similar to the “hukou” in China, “hoju”
in Korea and “koseki” in Japan. The “ho khau” is a remnant of the centrally planned economy that was
employed by the States for public security and control of migration. Those moving from one district to
another must meet certain requirements in order to transfer their “ho khau”.
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We proceed to test for endogenous mobility. First, we estimate equation (8) using the
Migration indicator as the outcome variable. Evident from Column 1 of Table 2, aerial
bombardment does not appear to be correlated with the probability of migration. Second,
we estimate the educational effect of aerial bombardment on the non-migrant population
and compare it with the impact on the full sample. The results are reported in Table A4.
Non-migrants are defined as those having permanent registration in their residential districts.
The proportion of non-migrants in our data is approximately 98.77%. The percentages of non-
migrants in the war and non-war cohorts are 99.19% and 98.38%, respectively. Evident from
Column 2, bombing has negative consequences on the education of non-migrants. Specifically,
a 10% increase in bomb density is associated with the decrease in educational attainment by
approximately 0.01 years. The effect is statistically significant and close in magnitude to the
effect on the full sample (Column 1).15 The results lend suggestive evidence against selective
migration.
Falsification Test - To lend additional support to the causal interpretation of the estimated
effect of bomb destruction on educational accumulation in Table 1, we conduct a falsification
test. Particularly, we run equation (8) with the war cohorts being those born between 1909
and 1940 (who should have completed their education before the bombardment started). The
1985-1996 cohorts still serve as a comparison unaffected group. If aerial bombardment indeed
reduces educational attainment, we expect to find no impact on individuals who finished
schooling prior to the onset of the Vietnam bombing. The result is reported in Column
2 of Table 2. The point estimate is both economically and statistically indistinguishable
from zero, suggesting no spurious relationship between bombing destruction and schooling
accumulation.
Nonlinear Effects - To explore the possible nonlinear effects of aerial bombardment, we
replace the single BombIntensityd measure in equation (8) with three indicators, each of
which takes the value of one if the bomb density in the district lies in the top, middle, and
bottom third of the bomb density distribution (with the bottom third dummy being omitted).
The results are reported in Column 3 of Table 2. The adverse effects are both economically
and statistically significant for individuals in districts in the top third of the bomb destruction
distribution. However, the point estimate falls short of statistical significance for individuals
15 We are unable to estimate the impact of aerial bombardment on the migrant population due to the small
sample size.
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in districts in the middle third of the bomb distribution.16
Robustness Checks - We examine the educational impacts of aerial bombardment using
equation (8) with different classifications of the war and non-war cohorts. Results are reported
in Table 3. In Column 1 and 2, the 1909-1935 and the 1935-1947 cohorts (who completed
schooling prior to the onset of the Allied bombing) are respectively defined as the non-war
cohorts, with the war cohorts being the 1953-1963 group. Point estimates are negative,
significant, and close in magnitude to the estimate in Table 1. In other words, our results are
robust to the choice of the older cohorts as the unaffected group.
In Column 3, all cohorts other than the main war cohorts (1953-1963) form the unaffected
group. We still find that a 10% increase in bomb density leads to a reduction of 0.01 years of
education. Recall that in Table 1, our main affected cohorts consist of individuals who spent
at least five years of schooling during the bombing period. Now, we include a wider range of
cohorts as the affected cohorts. Specifically, in Column 4, individuals who ever spent any
time of their schooling years in the bombardment period, i.e. those born between 1948 and
1968, constitute our affected group. The educational effects of bombing are still negative and
significant, although the point estimate is smaller than the one in Table 1. In Column 5,
individuals exposed to the aerial bombardment for at least eight school years are categorized
as the war cohorts. The estimated impact is similar to the effect in the main specification.
Particularly, a 10% increase in bomb density is associated with a decline of 0.01 years of
schooling.17 The results in Table 3 show that different categorizations of the affected and
unaffected groups leave our results essentially unchanged.18
5.1.3 Heterogeneity in Bombing Tactics
In this section, we attempt to explore the heterogeneous impacts of different bombing tactics
on educational attainment. It is possible that bombs the mission of which was to destroy
16 Sample size is larger than that in Column 1 of Table 1 because here we take into account six districts with
zero bomb destruction. These districts belong to the omitted bottom third category.
17 In a different specification, we impute the total number of educational years based on the reported grades
completed and educational level, and re-estimate our main specification (1) using the imputed total years
of education as the dependent variable. Particularly, individuals with college, university, master, and Ph.D.
degrees are assigned with 14, 16, 18, and 20 years of education, respectively. The result is similar to the
baseline estimate and is provided in Column 2 of Table A3.
18 In the main results, standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level. In Panel A of Table A5,
we replicate the specifications in Table 1 but change the cluster level to the district. Our results remain
the same.
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physical capital would leave more severe impacts than bombs without such destruction
missions. It could also be expected that the effects of military strikes are larger than those
of general raids. It is because military strikes tend to involve more precise and intentional
attacks as well as more powerful classes of weapons.19 Therefore, we re-estimate equation (8)
with different measures of bomb density. Specifically, we focus on bombs with destruction
and non-destruction missions (Column 2 and 3), bombs used in military strikes as opposed
to general raids (Column 4 and 5). The estimating results are reported in Table 4.
In Column 1, we replicate the main result in Table 1 (Column 1) where we consider the
weight of all weapons regardless of missions or targets. When we restrict the measure bomb
density to bombs with the missions of destroying physical capital, we detect negative and
significant impacts on educational accumulation. Column 2 suggests that the educational gap
between a school-age individual during the bombardment period in the districts with maximal
bomb density and the one in the average bombed district is 0.3 years. This magnitude is
similar to the main result. Moving to Column 3, as we consider bombs with non-destruction
missions, the estimated effect of aerial bombardment, although negative, is much smaller in
magnitude and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. As expected, bombing intended
for destruction missions imposes more severe consequences on educational attainment than
bombing with non-destruction missions.
We proceed to estimate the impacts of aerial bombardment by target types, including: (i)
targets subject to military strikes, and (ii) targets subject to general raids. Evident from
Column 4 and 5, bombs used in both military strikes and general raids adversely affect
educational attainment. The estimates are both economically and statistically significant for
both scenarios. In addition, we find that the magnitude is slightly larger for bombs used in
military strikes.
5.2 Results on Labor Market Outcomes
In this subsection, we explore the effects of aerial bombardment on future labor market
outcomes. The dependent variable is the log of individual annual earnings. Because the
unaffected group comprises individuals born in 1985-1996 and the information on earnings is
taken from the 2010-2014 data wave, there could be a problem with right-censoring of the
outcome variables. Therefore, the analyses in this section are further limited to individuals
19 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this interesting point.
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aged 23-60, those supposed to be on the labor market with a college degree. In addition to
previously discussed controls in Section 4, the earning regressions are conditioned on age and
the square of age to account for working experiences. The main DiD estimate in Column 1 of
Table 5 is negative and significant. Specifically, a 10% increase in bomb density leads to a
1.1% decrease in annual earnings for individuals exposed to aerial bombardment for at least
five school years. Put it differently, the annual earnings of an individual in the most heavily
bombed district is around 70% of the yearly income of an individual in a district with an
average destruction level.
The results from the heterogeneity analyses by gender and mother’s education are presented
in Column 2 through 5. Aerial bombardment worsens future market outcomes of females and
left males’ future earnings intact, as evident in Column 2 and 3. The estimated effect on
male earnings is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero while the effect on female
earnings is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with results on educational
attainment presented in Section 5.1 where bomb destruction leads to larger reductions in
completed grades for females than males. The finding is consonant with Shemyakina (2010).
In exploring the heterogeneity along the line of maternal education, the impact on individuals
with higher-educated mothers is small and insignificant (Column 4). As shown in Column
5, the effect of bombing devastation on the earnings of individuals from a disadvantaged
background (mother’s educational level is primary or less) is negative and larger in magnitude,
despite the lack of statistical evidence. Due to a high number of missing values in maternal
education, a level of caution should be exercised in interpreting estimates in Column 4-5.20
Collectively, we uncover adverse long-term ramifications of aerial bombardment on individual
earnings. Particularly, a 10% increase in bomb density is associated with a 1.1% decline
in annual earnings for individuals exposed to aerial bombardment for at least five school
years. To put the numbers into perspectives, the annual earning gap between an individual
in the district with maximal bomb density and the one in an average bombed district is 30%.
Consistent with the results on educational attainment, violent conflict disrupts the education
process, thus reducing productivity reflected in lower future earnings. Our findings highlight
the detrimental cost of violent conflict to human capital, thus corroborating prior studies on
the burden of conflict in terms of future labor market outcome (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer,
20 In Panel B of Table A5, we replicate the specifications in Table 5 but change the cluster level to the district.
Our results remain the same.
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2004; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014).
6 Possible Mechanisms
In this section, we explore the potential channels that drive the long-term impacts of
aerial bombardment on educational attainment and consequently, labor market outcomes.
Prior studies show that the detrimental consequences of aerial bombardment on schooling
accumulation among the war cohorts could potentially be transmitted through both the
supply side and the demand side of the education production function. Specifically, Glewwe
and Jacoby (1994) and Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) point out that through the supply side, aerial
bombardment could destroy schools, and increase the absence of teachers. Further more,
through the demand side, adverse income shocks to households (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997,
Thomas et al., 2004), sizable damages to both mental and physical health (Hoeffler and
Reynal-Querol, 2003, Ghobarah et al., 2003, Annan et al., 2006, Evans and Miguel, 2007)
could possibly shrink the number of students.
To explore the potential mechanisms, we employ the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)
conducted by the US and the South Vietnam during 1969-1973. HES is a quarterly dataset
that offers a wide range of information on economic, social, and security conditions in all
hamlets (clusters of habitats within a village) in the South Vietnam. The time of the survey
overlaps with the bombing period, making it ideal for our study. One disadvantage is that
HES does not cover the North Vietnam. Original responses in categorical form are turned
into binary indicators. These indicators are averaged to the district level across the sample
period (Dell et al., 2018).
Following prior studies, we categorize the mechanisms into two groups: supply-side factors
and demand-side factors of the education production function. Particularly, to capture the
supply-side channels, we make use of three measures, namely, (i) the percentage of residential
clusters within district (hamlets) where school attendance was restricted due to security
concerns (Lack School Security), (ii) the fraction of hamlets where school attendance was
restricted due to the lack of teachers (Lack Teachers), and (iii) the proportion of hamlets
where school attendance was restricted due to the lack of school facilities (Lack Facilities).
We proceed to the demand side of the education production function. Demand-side channels
are first represented by factors that could affect individual health (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol,
2003, Ghobarah et al., 2003, Annan et al., 2006, Evans and Miguel, 2007). Since aerial
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bombardment could engender serious impairments to individual health by inflicting casualties
and destroying hospitals, thus restricting access to healthcare service, we utilize (i) the
proportion of hamlets where the military activities were the direct cause of casualties among
residents (Residential Casualties) and (ii) the fraction of hamlets with accessible medical
services to residents (Healthcare Access). Second, aerial bombardment could leave negative
repercussions on educational attainment through adverse income shocks to households (Jacoby
and Skoufias, 1997, Thomas et al., 2004). To proxy for income shocks, we look at (iii) the
percentage of hamlets where the military activities were the direct cause of physical damage to
residential properties (Damaged Properties), (iv) the proportion of hamlets with households
requiring welfare assistance to maintain the subsistence level (Assistance to Survive), and (v)
the faction of hamlets with needy households receiving assistance from the government in the
past quarter (Past Quarter Assistance).
To examine whether the educational repercussions of bombing could be explained by the
above-mentioned demand-side and supply-side factors, we estimate the following equation,
Md = α0 + α1BombIntensity + Γ
′
dψ + υd (9)
where Md is the potential mechanism. Subscript d stands for district. BombIntensity is
the log of bomb density. Γ′d is a set of district-level geographic controls including districts’
centroid longitude, latitude, distance to coast, average precipitation, temperature, terrain
ruggedness, land suitability, the share of arable land (excluding water, snow, and ice surface,
as well as barren or sparsely vegetated surface) in district total areas, average altitude and
district centroid distance to Ho Chi Minh Trail. The coefficient α1 represents the estimated
effect of aerial bombardment on the supply side and demand-side factors.
We provide district-level regression results in Table 6. Looking at the supply side in Panel
A, bombing devastation increases the percentage of hamlets where school attendance was
restricted due to security concerns and due to the lack of teachers (Column 1 and 2).
Specifically, a 10% increase in bomb density is associated with the increase in the fraction of
hamlets with security concerns and the fraction of hamlets lacking teachers by 0.24 and 0.25
percentage points, respectively. We do not have enough statistical evidence for the impacts
of bombing on the fraction of hamlets lacking school facilities (Column 3). It is possible that
the supply-side factors, proxied by the worsening school security and the lack of teachers,
could be one pathway to the educational consequences of aerial bombardment.
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Moving to the demand side in Panel B, it is likely that bombing devastation increases
the proportion of hamlets where the military activities were the direct cause of resident
casualties and physical damages to residential properties (Column 1 and 3). In addition,
there is suggestive evidence that aerial bombardment could have restricted residential access
to medical services (Column 2) and raised the percentage of hamlets where households
needed welfare assistance to maintain the subsistence level (Column 4). Aerial bombardment,
however, is not associated with the receipt of government assistance in the past quarter
among needy households (Column 5). Taken together, demand-side factors, captured by
residential casualties, restricted access to healthcare, damaged properties, and increased
reliance on welfare assistance, could be potential mechanisms driving the detrimental impacts
of bombing.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by providing causal evidence on the ramifications of
large-scale physical destruction during the Allied bombing of Vietnam. Notably, we exploit
the district-by-cohort variation in bomb intensity in a DiD framework to quantify the effects
of interest. The paper also utilizes the newly released dataset (THOR) to construct a more
accurate measure of aerial destruction, the total weight of all weapons dropped onto a district
per km2 area. Not only do we estimate the long-term effects of aerial bombardment on
educational attainment and labor market outcomes but we also uncover potential channels
driving these effects.
The negative repercussions on schooling accumulation detected in this paper highlight the
long-term consequences of aerial bombardment. Specifically, we find that a 10% increase in
bomb density leads to a reduction of 0.01 educational years for individuals who spent at least
five schooling years during the bombing of Vietnam. To put these numbers into perspective,
a school-aged individual in the most destroyed district completed 0.3 fewer years of education
than his/her peer in the district with an average bomb density level. Furthermore, we find
that bombing devastation also worsens future earnings. Particularly, the annual earnings
of an individual in the most heavily bombed district are approximately 70% of the yearly
income of an individual in a district with an average destruction level.
We attribute these detrimental consequences to both the supply-side and the demand-side
factors of education. Specifically, the supply-side factors, proxied by inadequate school
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security and the lack of teachers, could be one pathway to the educational consequences
of aerial bombardment. Furthermore, the demand-side factors, captured by residential
casualties, restricted access to healthcare, damaged properties, and increased reliance on
welfare assistance could also be the channels through which aerial bombardment depresses
educational attainment, and thus future earnings.
Our findings offer meaningful implications for policymakers. By showing the adverse ram-
ifications of aerial bombardment on human capital, this paper sheds additional light on
the persistent cost of violent conflict that has been insufficiently considered. Exposure to
conflict during school age decreases educational accumulation and worsens future labor
market outcome. Since the returns to education go beyond personal earnings, the decline in
educational attainment among the war cohorts could have affected other aspects of their lives
such as health (Silles, 2009; Conti et al., 2010; Kemptner et al., 2011), and the outcomes
of their offspring (Currie and Moretti, 2003; McCrary and Royer, 2011; Lundborg et al.,
2014). Affected individuals could transmit these socioeconomic disadvantages to the future
generation, aggravating social inequality and hindering economic development. Our results
suggest that the prevention and reduction of conflict should be put as one of the global
priorities, in order to promote peaceful societies for sustainable development (SDG-16). Our
findings further imply that post-conflict reconstruction initiatives are important when conflicts
already occurred. Government interventions aiming to improve the abilities/skills of affected
individuals could help lessen the cost of conflict.
Declaration of Interest Statement: The authors have no conflict of interest.
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Appendix - Generalized DiD
In the main DiD specification, we exploit the exogenous district-by-cohort variation in the
devastation of aerial bombing where treatment is the interaction between WarCohortic
dummy and BombIntensityd (the natural log of bomb density in a given district). For the
β1 coefficient on this interaction to have a causal interpretation, the fundamental identifying
assumption, which is, had the aerial bombardment not occurred, the difference in schooling
accumulation between the unaffected and affected (war) cohorts would have been the same
across districts with varying bomb intensity levels, must be satisfied. To assess this assumption,
we specify the generalized version of equation (8) by estimating the cohort-specific impacts
of aerial bombardment:
Yidt = β0 +
11∑
g=1
(Cohortig × BombIntensityd)β1g +X
′
idcγ + δd + λt + ǫidc (10)
where Yidt is the outcome for individual i residing in district d and born in year t. Cohortig
is an indicator taking the value of 1 if an individual i was born in cohort g. Birth cohorts
are grouped into 11 years of birth categories, and the cohorts 1985-1996 constitute the
comparison group and are omitted from the regression. Each coefficient β1g represents the
effects of bombing destruction on a given cohort group. If the “parallel trend” is satisfied
then the impact of aerial bombardment should be indistinguishable from zero for cohorts
that completed their education before the start of the Allied bombing (cohorts born prior to
1948), or for any cohorts who did not spend their schooling years during the devastation time.
We provide the estimates for the cohort-specific effects of aerial bombardment on educational
attainment using equation (10) in Table A6.21 For cohorts of 1948-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-
1960, and 1961-1964 the estimated effects are negative and significant while for other cohorts
(who finished schooling prior to the bombardment period, e.g. the 1937-1941 cohort, or
attained education after the end of the bombing destruction, e.g. the 1975-1984 cohort),
point estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Individuals born in 1953-1957
and 1961-1964 respectively completed 0.014 and 0.011 fewer years of education in response to
a 10% increase in bomb density. In other words, individuals born in 1953-1957 in a district
with maximal bomb destruction completed 0.45 fewer educational years than those in a
21 In the generalized DiD framework, we include all cohorts (1909-1996) and group them into different
categories. There are 11 groups and cohorts 1985-1996 are omitted from the regression.
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district with an average destruction level. The reduction in years of education for cohorts
1948-1952 and 1958-1960 is around 0.008 to 0.009, respectively, following a 10% bomb density
increment.22 Figure A1 plots the cohort-specific coefficients and the corresponding 90%
confidence interval.
22 Cohorts of 1948-1952 were exposed to the bombardment from 0.5 to 4 school years.
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MAIN TABLES
Table 1: Impacts of Bombardment on Educational Attainment
Mother with Mother with
All Male Female higher than primary
Individuals Only Only primary education
education or less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WarCohort × -0.098∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.390∗∗∗
BombIntensity (0.031) (0.042) (0.041) (0.062) (0.125)
Sample size 32,440 15,662 16,778 3,233 2,540
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8). War cohorts consist of individuals born in
1953-1963. The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. Regressions are
conditioned on district, birth year, survey year fixed effects, and province-specific time trend. Individual
observable characteristics include gender, mother education, an indicator for living in the north, and
the interactions of these characteristics with birth year dummies. Additional controls consist of the
interactions between district-level geographic characteristics and birth year indicators. See Section 3
for the details on geographic controls. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level.
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1.
Table 2: Tests for Endogenous Mobility, Falsification, and Nonlinear Effects
Years of Years of
Migration Education Education
(1) (2) (3)
WarCohort × -0.002 -0.008 WarCohort × Middle Third -0.034
BombIntensity (0.001) (0.044) Bomb Intensity (0.125)
WarCohort × Top Third -0.322∗∗
Bomb Intensity (0.142)
Sample size 32,440 23,452 33,702
NOTE: Column 1 reports the coefficient β1 in equation (8) but the outcome is the Migration indicator. In
Column 1, the war cohorts consist of individuals born in 1953-1963 and the comparison (i.e. unaffected)
cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. Column 2 presents the result of a falsification test (using
specification (1)) where the war cohorts include individuals born prior to 1940 and the unaffected
cohorts comprise individuals born in 1985-1996. Column 3 shows the possible nonlinear impacts of
bomb destruction where the single BombIntensity measure is replaced with indicators which take the
value of one if the bomb density in the district lies in the top, middle, and bottom third of the bomb
density distribution (with the bottom third dummy being omitted). Standard errors are clustered at
the district-by-birth year level. ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on
control variables.
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Table 3: Bombardment and Education: Different Unaffected and War Cohorts
Y = Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WarCohort× -0.149∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.102∗∗
BombIntensity (0.056) (0.047) (0.024) (0.026) (0.040)
Sample size 18,784 21,431 80,692 44,924 24,477
War Cohorts 1953-1963 1953-1963 1953-1963 1948-1968 1956-1960
Non-war Cohorts 1909-1935 1935-1947 Others 1985-1996 1985-1996
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8) with different categorizations of the war and
non-war cohorts. Standard errors are clustered at district-by-birth year level. ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05,
∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
Table 4: Bombardment and Education: Heterogeneity in Bombing Tactics
Y=Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WarCohort × -0.098*** -0.079** -0.025 -0.083*** -0.076**
BombIntensity (0.031) (0.031) (0.017) (0.029) (0.032)
Sample Size 32,440 32,112 26,788 31,906 30,989
Bomb Characteristics All Bombs with Bombs with Bombs in Bombs in
Bombs destruction non-destruction military general
missions missions strikes raid
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8). In Column 1, BombIntensity includes all types
of bombing. In Column 2, the measure of bomb density is restricted to bombs the mission of which was
to destroy physical capital. Column 3 considers bombs with non-destruction missions. In Column 4,
BombIntensity only includes bombs used in military strikes. BombIntensity in Column 5 is restricted
to bombs used in general raids. Standard errors are clustered at district-by-birth year level. ∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
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Table 5: Impacts of Bombardment on Earnings
Mother with Mother with
All Male Female higher than primary
Individuals Only Only primary education
education or less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WarCohort × -0.109∗ 0.023 -0.169∗∗ 0.050 -0.285
BombIntensity (0.058) (0.088) (0.078) (0.179) (0.195)
Sample size 22,535 10,668 11,867 2,289 1,823
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8). War cohorts consist of individuals born in
1953-1963. The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. Standard errors
are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05,
∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
Table 6: Potential Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Supply-side Factors
Lack School Lack Lack
Security Teachers Facilities
BombIntensity 0.024*** 0.025** 0.011
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012)
Sample size 316 316 315
Panel B: Demand-side Factors
Residential Healthcare Damaged Assistance Past Quarter
Casualties Access Properties to Survive Assistance
BombIntensity 0.020*** -0.009** 0.015*** 0.015* 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006)
Sample size 317 317 317 329 317
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficient on the log of bomb density (Bomb Intensity) from the regressions
where mechanisms variables are regressed on BombIntensity and a set of district-level geographic
controls. The geographic controls include districts’ centroid longitude, latitude, distance to coast, average
precipitation, temperature, terrain ruggedness, land suitability, the share of arable land (excluding water,
snow, and ice surface, as well as barren or sparsely vegetated surface) in district total areas, average
altitude and district centroid distance to Ho Chi Minh Trail. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level and provided in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A1: Number of School Years Affected from Aerial Bombardment
Minimum Cohorts Minimum Cohorts Minimum Cohorts
Exposed Years Exposed Years Exposed years
1 1949-1967 4 1952-1964 7 1955-1961
2 1950-1966 5 1953-1963 8 1956-1960
3 1951-1965 6 1954-1962 9 1957-1959
Table A2: Summary Statistics
Affected Unaffected All Bombed Districts
Mean Mean Mean Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Individual Panel B: District
Years of Education 7.51 9.75 Bomb Density (t/km2) 11.42 279.38
(3.56) (3.09) (26.40)
Annual Earnings 35,614 29,210
(41,173) (24,608)
Year of Birth 1958 1989 Number of Provinces 63
(3.09) (2.95)
Sample size 15,113 17,327 Number of Districts 625
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Affected group refer to individuals born in the period of
1953-1963. Unaffected group includes those born in the period of 1985-1996. Monetary values of earnings
are in ’000 VND, 2010 constant price.
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Table A3: Bombardment and Education: Supplementary Specifications
Years of Imputed Years
Education of Education
(1) (2)
WarCohort × Log(1+Bomb Density) -0.159∗∗∗
(0.049)
WarCohort × Bomb Intensity -0.099∗∗∗
(0.035)
Sample size 33,702 32,440
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8). War cohorts consist of individuals born in
1953-1963. The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. In Column 1,
BombIntensityd is defined as the log of (1+Bomb Density) to account for districts with no bombing
destruction. In Column 2, BombIntensityd is still the log of Bomb Density, but dependent variable
is the imputed years of education (individuals with college, university, master, and PhD degrees are
assigned with 14, 16, 18, and 20 educational years respectively). See the note under Table 1 for details
on control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4: Additional Testing for Endogenous Mobility
Y = Years of Education
(1) (2)
WarCohort×BombIntensity -0.098∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Sample size 32,440 32,039
Sample Full Non-migrants
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8). War cohorts consist of individuals born in
1953-1963. The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. See the note
under Table 1 for details on control variables. Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample. Column
2 and 3 present the estimates for non-movers and movers, respectively. Migrants are defined as those
lacking permanent registration in their district of residence. See Section 5.1.2 for more details. Standard
errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Impacts of Bombardment: Different Cluster Level
Mother with Mother with
All Male Female higher than primary
Individuals Only Only primary education
education or less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Years of Education
WarCohort × -0.098∗∗ -0.083∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.040 -0.390∗∗∗
BombIntensity (0.042) (0.050) (0.048) (0.079) (0.141)
Sample size 32,440 15,662 16,778 3,233 2,540
Panel B: Annual Earnings
WarCohort × -0.109∗ 0.023 -0.169∗∗ 0.050 -0.285
BombIntensity (0.060) (0.091) (0.084) (0.179) (0.215)
Sample size 22,535 10,668 11,867 2,289 1,823
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (8). War cohorts consist of individuals born in
1953-1963. The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. Regressions are
conditioned on district, birth year, survey year fixed effects, and province-specific time trend. Individual
observable characteristics include gender, mother education, an indicator for living in the north, and
the interactions of these characteristics with birth year dummies. Additional controls consist of the
interactions between district-level geographic characteristics and birth year indicators. See Section 3 for
the details on geographic controls. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and provided in the
parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1.
Table A6: Bombardment and Educational Outcomes by Cohorts
Years of Education
Coefficients Std. Errors
(1) (2)
Born before 1936×BombIntensity 0.013 (0.048)
Born(1937-1941)×BombIntensity -0.021 (0.062)
Born(1942-1947)×BombIntensity -0.007 (0.054)
Born(1948-1952)×BombIntensity -0.074 (0.048)
Born(1953-1957)×BombIntensity -0.140∗∗∗ (0.040)
Born(1958-1960)×BombIntensity -0.086∗∗ (0.043)
Born(1961-1964)×BombIntensity -0.105∗∗∗ (0.036)
Born(1965-1968)×BombIntensity -0.018 (0.038)
Born(1969-1974)×BombIntensity 0.042 (0.033)
Born(1975-1984)×BombIntensity 0.015 (0.027)
Sample size 80,692
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1g in equation (10). Omitted cohorts are individuals born during
1985-1996. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
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Figure A1: Impacts of Bombardment on Years of Education by Cohorts, 90% CI.
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